Emergence Of Cooperation In Public Goods Game

Main Category: Psychology / Psychiatry
Also Included In: Biology / Biochemistry
Article Date: 15 Jan 2009 - 6:00 PDT

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Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals.

In this paper, we investigate a stochastic model of games involving any number of individuals and show that natural selection can favour a reciprocator replacing a population of defectors in the repeated Prisoner Dilemma Game.

Additionally, unlike what has been argued in the deterministic model, our stochastic model suggests that the evolution of cooperation in public goods game can be facilitated by larger group size.

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Proceedings B is the Royal Society's flagship biological research journal, dedicated to the rapid publication and broad dissemination of high-quality research papers, reviews and comment and reply papers. The scope of journal is diverse and is especially strong in organismal biology.

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences